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Examining alternative forms of utility
regulation: The incentives and disincen-
tives of the regulatory structure
The traditional form ofregulating public utilities -- command-and-control -- has been
found inadequate by some to cope with marketplace changes that have introduced competi-
tion into previously monopolistic markets. Alternativeforms ofregulation, particularly
incentive regulation, have been developed in various areas ofthe nation in response to the
new competitive utility environment. In the following articles, former Maine Public
Utilities Commission chair Ralph Gelder, New England Telephone Vice President for
Maine, Edward Dinan, and Central Maine Power executive Vice President David
Flanagan discuss these emergent utility issues. A fourth and quite different view ofthe
present regulatory system and its alternatives is provided by Joseph Donahue, an Augusta
attorney who frequently represents several major industries in utility proceedings.
Why alternative forms of
regulation?
by Ralph Gelder
The question before us is "alterna-
tive forms of regulation." That
raises the immediate question:
Why alternatives? What's wrong
with our traditional form of regula-
tion? Is there something that may
need fixing?
Let me put those questions in the
context of the competitive model
that governs most industries in the
United States. Markets provide
strong incentives for these indus-
tries to be efficient and also to
succeed. If a firm is not efficient,
then it will not succeed and it will
disappear from the marketplace.
But the electricity, telephone,
water, and gas industries have not
fit that competitive model, at least
not for most of this century. These
utilities were viewed as natural
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monopolies. Competing power
lines and transmission facilities were
viewed as inefficient. The conven-
tional wisdom of the time believed
that a monopoly was required to
take advantage of the scale econo-
mies. On the other hand, public
policy was concerned about price
gouging and the incentive to offer
poor service or to offer only limited
servIces.
To deal with the downside
problems of natural monopolies,
the states and the Congress intro-
duced the concept of economic
regulation of monopolies. In
exchange for an exclusive franchise
to serve an area, utilities had to
agree to comprehensive price and
service regulation. Legislators and
members of Congress did not want
this function performed in the halls
of Congress or the legislature, so
they created regulatory commis-
sions. Regulatory commissions had
the responsibility to set a fair return
on the rate of capital, one that was
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sufficient to attract the funds
needed to operate the utilities. More
importantly, the commissions were
given the responsibility to see that
monopolies serve "the public
interest." This regulatory model
was viewed as a surrogate for the
market system; regulation would
seek to assure safe and adequate
service and guard against monopoly
profits. Consumers, business,
industry, and individuals should
benefit by receiving lower, more
stable prices than would be avail-
able under the pure monopoly
system. The disadvantages of
regulation are that it is very legalis-
tic and litigious. The system is
strictly cost plus . There is little
incentive for the regulated mo-
nopoly to be efficient or creative,
except to the extent that the regula-
tory commission can review the
firm's performance after the fact.
Emerging competition
In recent years, this traditional
regulatory scheme has started to
crumble. This disintegration has
occurred not because regulators are
inept or stupid (although I remem-
ber being called that a few times
when I was on the Maine Public
Utilities Commission). Monopoly
is no longer an absolute characteris-
tic of these industries. Competition
showed up first in railroads, truck-
ing and airlines. Then telecommuni-
cations began to acquire more
competitive forces. And now
competition is spreading into
electricity and gas. As a result,
competitive firms now exist, side
by side, with monopoly firms
subject to regulation.
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This emerging competition was
not simply dreamed up by some-
one. Competition came because of
technology. Trucks challenged the
railroads. Microwave, computers,
and cellular have challenged the
telephone industry. This technol-
ogy was really beyond anyone's
control. But the initial regulatory
reaction to these changes was
usually to protect the industry
against this competition. But when
regulators begin to protect an
industry from outside competition,
we should raise questions about
what is required to regulate that
industry. The old Bell System
model was a classic example. The
prevailing model was, "The system
is the solution." In fact, the Bell
System argued that all of the
system, including the manufacture
of the phone sets in the customer's
hand, had to be part of the Bell
System. Otherwise, the Bell System
argued, there would be chaos.
The current question is, given the
realities of the marketplace, how
can the regulatory structure over-
come lack of incentives to be
efficient in the utility business?
Can you add incentives to regula-
tion, or put more broadly, should
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regulation eventually give way
to competition as the primary
regulator?
I do not have all the answers to
these questions. But it is clear that
if nothing is done, and if regulators
insist upon the traditional regula-
tory model, competitors will even-
tually capture large segments of the
market to the disadvantage of those
consumers who must remain with
the utility. Thus, regulators must
allow utilities to meet competition,
but they must also prevent preemp-
tive pricing behavior that would
stifle that emerging competition.
Utilities must be provided with
incentives to be efficient in order to
meet these competitive challenges.
These objectives define a very
difficult task. Careful balancing is
required. In recent years, regulators
have given, or have attempted to
give, more pricing flexibility for
services subject to competition
while trying to build a wall around
the monopoly elements. Unfortu-
nately, that wall is itself a problem.
What is a monopoly today may
be competitive tomorrow. Utilities
require the incentives to cut costs
and to downsize to meet the
realities of market.
New regulatory schemes
Some have questioned why
regulation should reward utilities to
do what they are supposed to do.
Quite simply, without proper
rewards, there is little incentive to
seek wrenching changes. Meaning-
ful rewards are required to motivate
the desired behavior.
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Today, there are nearly 100
different utility regulatory schemes,
or incentive regulation plans, across
country. But generally speaking,
these schemes fall into two basic
categories -- specific and compre-
hensive. Specific plans are designed
to achieve a certain type of
behavior. Conservation programs,
plant performance standards, and
programs to reduce consumer
complaints are examples. We will
see more plans on environmental
performance standards to encourage
utilities to use the market mecha-
nisms built into the Clean Air Act
of 1990. These mechanisms are
trying to achieve specific types of
improved performance and efficient
behavior. The broader and more
comprehensive incentive programs
include price freezes, price caps,
performance index standards, and
activity indexes. The point of these
comprehensive programs is to
reward companies for the risks that
they take.
There are older regulatory pro-
grams, which strike me as inappro-
priate in this new) competitive
environment. For example, the
regulators need to move away from
features like fuel adjustment clauses,
which do not build incentives into
the system. In fact, fuel clauses
completely remove risk from the
system; the risk is passed along to
ratepayers. Regulators must let
the market mechanism work. If a
utility does well on minimizing
petroleum costs, then they should
be rewarded.
Today, most of the programs are
still specific. But as competition
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increases, incentive programs will
become more comprehensive in
nature. We may even see an even-
tual migration toward economic
deregulation. Transportation
certainly has gone that way. When
I served on the Maine PUC, much
of the Public Utilities
Commission's time was absorbed
by efforts to protect existing truck-
ers, which did not make sense.
So the legislature passed a bill dereg-
ulating the industry. Ten years
later, the world has not collapsed.
Some of the trucking firms disap-
peared, but that is the nature of the
process. The market is being served
better by competition.
Incentive program requirements
I want to suggest some require-
ments of good incentive programs.
First, we should design plans that
are consistent with the company's
self interests. Basically, regulation
should fit into the corporate cul-
ture. Increasingly, that means profit
incentives. If regulation emphasizes
service, then companies will pro-
vide services. But they will provide
it with more employees and higher
costs. But if profits are emphasized,
we will see lower costs . The second
incentive requirement is that we
move the company towards more
competitive pricing. Although the
fear is always that pricing freedom
will result in higher prices, the
experience has been that the prices
go down with greater
competltlOll.
A third incentive requirement is
that the plan must be simple and
easy to understand. The rewards
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must be clear. The plans also must
be balanced. There should be extra
rewards for extra performance and
penalties or no rewards for poor
performance. The rewards must be
meaningful. Former Central Maine
Power Company President John
Rowe has said that "the rat has to
smell the cheese." The utility
executives must see meaningful
benefits to be motivated to take
advantage of them.
Plans should also be largely
automatic once that they are in
place. Regulators will review these
plans but the utilities should be
allowed make their own decisions.
When utilities make mistakes, the
inclination to micromanage should
be resisted. Finally, the plans should
be fairly long run. After three to
five years, plans can be reviewed.
What will an alternative regula-
tion program provide in the long
run? I think that we will get lower
prices, and also more stable prices,
for consumers in Maine and else-
where. Consumers will also receive
the protection of choice. Competi-
tion, or an incentive regulatory
strategy, should provide choice.
Companies and consumers can be
much better off under incentive
regulation. If states ignore the
realities of competition and persist
with a very heavy-handed form of
regulation, the ultimate result will
be higher prices for utility services.
Incentive regulation must make it
profitable to cut costs and to down-
size to provide service. If incentive
regulation achieve this, then prices
at the very least will not increase
and may even go down.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, incentive regula-
tion is a way of introducing flexibil-
ity into the regulatory process. Its
goal is more efficient behavior,
which is closer to the competitive
model. New regulatory schemes
must assure opportunities for
people to choose the means of
protecting themselves rather than
relying on fixed prices with tradi-
tional cost-plus regulation. Yes, it
will be difficult to accomplish this.
It will be difficult to mix competi-
tion and monopoly. Trade-offs
must be made. But technology
cannot be reversed. New firms with
new technologies and cost efficien-
cies cannot be kept from the
market. Attempts to prevent new
entry are fraught with problems for
the regulated utility, for regulatory
commissions, and for the people
who pay for these services.
There is no single correct regula-
tory structure. A structure appro-
priate for Maine may not be appro-
priate in Florida or elsewhere in the
country. Plans must initially be
tailor-made for individual states.
But, ultimately, these incentive
regulation plans will become more
generalized. Eventually, we may
deregulate certain segments of the
industry, much as has happened in
transportation. More and more the
marketplace will supplant regula-
tion. Consumers will gain when
competition assures that people
have choices -- choices that can
protect them from monopoly
pricing and behavior.
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What do alternative
forms of regulation
mean for regulated utili-
ties, consumers, and the
environment?
by Edward Dinan
Introduction
Alternative approaches to regula-
tion have received much attention
recently. The inherent weaknesses
in the more traditional rate-of-
return approach are widely appreci-
ated. New regulatory concepts --
such as earnings sharing, price caps,
and social contracts -- have been
gaining wide support in many
jurisdictions. Why are there the
makings of a regulatory revolution
out there? And what do these
various alternative forms of regula-
tion offer consumers and utilities?
Or, as some traditionalists have
asked the question, why should we
change a regulatory structure that
has worked well for nearly half a
century?
The simple answer to all of these
questions must come from the
purpose of regulation itself -- that is
to simulate a competitive, market-
driven economy. Over the years,
rate-of-return regulation of telecom-
munications has done a good job of
mirroring the effects of a competi-
tive environment by: (i) promoting
the attainment of certain public
policy goals, (ii) fostering efficient
and prudent utility network deploy-
ment, (iii) stressing service quality,
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(iv) maintaining reasonable costs
to consumers, and (v) allowing
shareholders an opportunity to
receive an equitable return on their
investment. All was relatively well
and stable in telecommunications
until the 1980s when the character-
istics of the regulated markets began
to change at an accelerated pace.
The break-up of the old Bell Sys-
tem, coupled with significant
technological improvements and
the advent of competition, brought
about sweeping market changes and
innovations. Unfortunately, the
traditional form of regulation, rate-
of-return regulation did not, and
could not, keep pace with the
dynamics of the marketplace.
The loud cries for regulatory
reform are being wailed with the
hope that regulatory policies and
the resulting regulatory structures
will be modified to keep pace with
the dynamics of the marketplace.
Too many of the regulatory pro-
cesses employed in the State of
Maine have become outmoded and
burdensome, which severely hin-
ders the efforts of regulated busi-
nesses to efficiently serve their
customers, to expand their busi-
nesses, and to contribute to the
economic expansion so desperately
needed by the State at this time.
Historical approach to telephone
utility regulation
Historically, the telecommunica-
tions industry has been character-
ized by two elements. First,
the majority of its productivity
gains were achieved by replacing
labor with capital. Technology
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development made this replacement
the primary opportunity to achieve
productivity gains and, conse-
quently, to lower prices. Second,
the industry basically had a single
product -- voice communications.
This product was in healthy
demand and the relatively simple
task for the telephone companies
was to supply this service effi-
ciently. Given these two factors,
regulatory policy appropriately
signaled telephone company man-
agement to concentrate on the
operations side of the business and
to find the proper mix of labor and
capital. Little attention was placed
on the needs of the customer
beyond plain old telephone service.
Rate-of-return regulation
mirrored the then-existing focus
on efficient operations. In the past,
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the telecommunications business
was less complex to regulate, as well
as to manage. Regulators used the
rate-of-return regulatory process to
determine the reasonableness of the
costs of these investments and
expenses that were passed onto
utility ratepayers. Even in simpler
times, this litigious process was
costly and time-consuming. Too
often, regulators became overly
involved in the details of the
business-management proposals.
Rather than taking the role of
strategic overseers who review
proposals broadly for compliance
with set regulations and for consis-
tency with established long-term
policy goals, regulators tended
to expand their oversight responsi-
bilities by taking a "command-and-
control" approach to their duties.
Regulatory staffs took on the role
of auditors in a business, and
scrutinized investment decisions
and day-to-day expenses. This
tactical approach to regulation
became difficult with limited staff
resources and the growing docket of
issues before regulators. Regulatory
agencies, in essence, duplicated the
management decision processes
already undertaken by utilities.
The duplication and transaction
costs associated with the rate-of-
return regulatory process can be
substantial. In addition, innovation
and the deployment of new
technology and services were
delayed. Yet, this litigious and
often adversarial process did not
yield substantial results, since rarely
have the investments or expenses of
telecommunications utilities been
found to be imprudent.
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New operating environment
Today's telecommunications
operating environments are
becoming more and more complex,
and thus more difficult to regulate
under the traditional rate-of-return
approach. The relatively simple
times of the past have ended.
The technology, the criteria to
justify its deployment, the market
opportunities, and customer expec-
tations are all changing dramatically
in today's world .
In the past, investment decisions
were primarily driven by expense
savings (e.g., lower labor costs),
where the expected results were
under the internal control of
the utility. But, with recently
completed network upgrades now
behind us in Maine (e.g., switch
replacements and fiber deploy-
ment), opportunities for significant
expense reduction have been greatly
reduced. The economic justification
for further technology deployment
has shifted from an expense-savings
focus to a revenue-enhancement
focus. This change in focus makes
both management's decision-
making process and the regulator's
oversight responsibilities more
complex. Investments driven by
potential new revenues carry a
greater risk than past deployment
decisions, over which management
had more control.
A change in the current form
of regulation is needed to keep
pace with the dynamics of the
marketplace. New service revenues
to support future network deploy-
ment will not come easily or
automatically. Unlike simple voice
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communication, sales of new I
innovative uses of the public
network will become more
involved and riskier and will
require a higher level of marketing
skill . The utility must understand
not only its own business, but also
the businesses and lifestyles of its
customers. Future sales of commu-
nications services will depend on
the ability to make business clients
more productive and complex
residential lifestyles more enjoyable
and easier to manage. These are
skills normally associated with a
market-driven entity.
Unfortunately, traditional rate-of-
return regulation works to impair
the development of these marketing
skills. Risky investment is not
stimulated under rate-of-return
regulation . Fearing that regulators
could disallow market-driven
investments that prove unsuc-
cessful, utilities temper their
marketing approaches and choose
only low-risk investments. True
market-driven environments accept
the challenge of trial-and-error
approaches. In comparison, tradi-
tional rate-of-return regulation does
not simulate the realities of the
market conditions utilities now
face. Regulatory systems must
recognize the necessity of this
iterative process and incorporate
them into regulatory structures.
Need to change approach to
regulation
The current form of telephone
utility regulation in Maine is out of
date and needs to be revisited. To
be truly effective, regulations must
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continually evolve to keep pace
with the dynamics of the environ-
ments they were originally designed
to oversee.
Maine's regulated industries are
changing rapidly. The issues facing
these businesses seem to grow
exponentially, both in number and
complexity. Regulatory bodies need
to develop strategic partnerships
with regulated industries to ensure
attainment of established policy
goals in a timely, cooperative and
efficient manner. Restraint is
necessary to avoid conducting
detailed and time-consuming case
reviews that no longer serve over-
riding policy goals. Established
regulatory policies need to be
revisited constantly to ensure that
they reflect current conditions and
the present needs of the State. For
example, current regulatory policy
goals need to become better
balanced to incorporate economic
development considerations to a
larger degree.
All participants in the regulatory
process need to spend more time
concentrating on the strategic
importance of policy goals, and less
time on the process itself. These
goals must evolve to keep pace with
dynamic business environments.
With a more strategic focus, regula-
tory participants can begin to foster
a better spirit of cooperation, along
with a better sense of mutual trust.
This concept of a more coopera-
tive, strategic and efficient regula-
tory process should be expected
from alternative forms of regula-
tions. The actual form of regulation
- call it profit sharing, price caps,
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social contracts or even ERAM --
is not as important as the need
to build a more flexible and
evolving process. Regulatory
bodies must take a broader goal-
oriented (or strategic) approach
to their duties, and thereby
enable regulation to adapt more
readily to the dynamics of the
industries being regulated. The
regulatory process can then
become more efficient and
helpful in fostering attainment of
appropriate policy goals, without
undercutting legitimate regula-
tory oversight responsibilities.
Path for regulatory reform
Such dramatic, yet necessary,
change to the regulatory
processes of Maine cannot be
expected to occur overnight. For
telephone utility regulation, I
see a natural three-stage progres-
sion away from the current,
inefficient "command-and
control" approaches of rate-of-
return regulations.
The first transitional step is
for the participants in the regula-
tory arena to build a more
collaborative approach to effec-
tive regulation. I touched upon
this concept earlier with the need
to assume a more strateglc
approach to regulation. In addi-
tion to changing the mindsets of
regulatory participants, it is
essential during this "collabora-
tive" phase to revisit the goals
that have been established for
regulation to ensure that they
reflect current conditions and
needs of Maine. The keys to an
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improved regulatory process are the
establishment and common accep-
tance of appropriate long-term
policy goals. All participants in the
regulatory process must remain
constantly aware of, and focused
on, the current policy goals when
evaluating the merits of the issues
before them.
Certainly, the greatest challenge
in this initial transition stage will be
to gaIn a consensus on appropnate
long-term policy objectives. Given
the overriding effect that legislation
has on policy decision-making,
current statutes affecting regulatory
policy need to be thoroughly
reviewed and revised where appro-
priate. Legislation should be enacted
to establish regulatory goals more
reflective of today's environment.
In addition to maintaining the long-
standing goal of universal service,
regulation needs to encourage the
development and deployment of
new technologies, the introduction
of new service applications, and
the efficient pricing of regulated
services. There can be no question
that pricing reform is necessary to
promote economic efficiency and to
support economic development in
this dramatically different operating
environment.
Once long-term policy goals are
established and the need for pricing
reform accepted, Maine can then
proceed onto the next phase:
"incentive regulation." Alternatives
to the current rate-af-return regula-
tory approach need to be tried and
adopted to keep pace with changing
market conditions. And again, the
exact form of this alternative
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regulation is not as important as
creating regulation to encourage
utilities to accept the new challenges
of the evolving marketplace. At
a minimum, this will require
greater marketing and operational
flexibility for utilities than what has
been associated with rate-of-return
regulation. In addition, earnings
incentives will be necessary to
stimulate risk bearing.
Overall, regulation must move
from the current detailed approach
to a more goal-oriented focus.
Eventually, regulation will move to
its final stage: "deregulation," or put
more bluntly, extinction. Market
forces and technological advances
will continue to evolve until com-
petitive markets abound and regula-
tion will no longer be needed. The
underlying purpose of regulation
is to simulate a competitive, market-
driven economy. Over time, the
need to simulate such an environ-
ment will diminish as utility
markets become increasingly
competitive.
For the record, I do not propose
to abolish all forms of regulation
tomorrow. Until markets become
more fully competitive, some form
of regulatory oversight is necessary
and useful. I do ask that regulation
better reflect the conditions of the
market, and evolve to keep pace
with market dynamics. This has not
occurred under rate-af-return
regulation and a timely change to
a more appropriate regulatory
structure is essential.
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Electric utilities:
Incentive regulation is
the best option
by David Flanagan
After decades of glacial change in
the era since the progressive move-
ment first imposed regulation on
electric utilities, the past few years
have seen a dramatic increase in the
pace and the scope of regulatory
change. These changes are creating
new forms of state and federal
oversight of utility regulation that
are fundamentally altering the
regulatory landscape for electricity.
Electric regulation
Before I move to these changes,
I would like to provide an overview
of the different types of regulation
that are now applied to electric
utilities. Electric utilities are
regulated at both the federal level,
by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and at the
state level, by state public utility
commissions. Federal jurisdiction
applies largely to interstate
commerce and to issues of national
policy, including most conspicu-
ously, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Regula-
tion of the activities of intrastate
electric franchises, such as Central
Maine Power, Bangor Hydro or
Maine Public Service, largely occurs
at the state level. This includes, for
example, issuance of certificates of
public convenience and necessity
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before new transmission or genera-
tion facilities are built and, above
all, determination of the rates paid
by customers.
Dual federal and state jurisdiction
over the industry appeared nearly as
early as electric regulation itself.
The Federal Power Act, adopted in
1920, created a Federal Power
Commission (now FERC) and
defined federal versus state jurisdic-
tion within the industry. This
landmark legislation was followed
by the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935, which was
intended to oversee the operation of
multi-state utility combinations and
to limit their power vis-a-vis indi-
vidual states. In 1978, Congress
responded to the Arab oil embargo
with the Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act (PURPA). This act
created a whole new class of genera-
tion facilities known as "qualifying
facilities" (QF's), which were given
very valuable regulatory exemp-
tions and tax advantages.
In October, 1992, Congress
enacted another major law, the
National Energy Policy Act of 1992
(EPAct), which holds the potential
to change dramatically the character
of our industry. Under EPAct,
utilities may compete for generation
business in each other's territory
through a new type of entity called
the "exempt wholesale generator"
(EWG's), and through reduced
restrictions on access to transmis-
sion facilities in other franchise
territories. Although the regulations
and clarifying judicial opinions for
this thousand-page federal act are
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still being written, it is evident that
this act will intensify competition
in the electricity business. This, in
turn, will affect the amount of
regulation that will be meaningfully
possible at the state level.
FERC and power generation
In the generation area, FERC
administers, to some extent,
PURPA, which radically changed
the market for new generation.
Despite its federal origin, PURPA
delegated to the states the ability to
create their own rules on how
utilities would purchase power
from qualified facilities and other
non-utility generators. In Maine,
the Public Utilities Commission
developed rules to determine each
utility's "avoided cost." In turn,
CMP and Bangor Hydro developed
. .
an auctlOn system to acqUire new
generation by bid. This has had a
dramatic impact on the sources of
power generation in Maine, to a
greater extent than virtually any
other state in the country. CMP,
through some 92 separate contracts,
is now getting forty percent of its
power from independent producers
of power, which range from hydro
facilities to trash burners to paper
mills. These contracts have had a
tremendous impact on both the
sources of power generation and the
cost of electric generation. The
National Energy Policy Act of 1992
has continued the deregulation of
electric power generation by
creating these exempt wholesale
generators, which will lead to more
competition in the generation area.
Alternative forms of regulation
Likewise, in the transmission area,
there is also a significant federal
role. Here, the FERC plays a large
role by setting tariffs for both
interstate and intrastate bulk power
transfers and wheeling. Under the
1992 act, the transmission market
has been opened up by empowering
FERC to order utilities to wheel
wholesale power, without regard to
existing customer relationships.
Utilities now have sixty days to
respond to a request for wheeling,
after which an applicant can request
FERC to order wheeling services. It
is even possible under this new act
that utilities would be required to
build more capacity to allow a
. . .
competitor transmiSSiOn access.
However, FERC has not yet
ordered retail wheeling. (Retail
wheeling is the transmission from a
generator to an individual customer
not in the generator's franchise
area.) State governments continue
to have the authority to govern
retail marketing areas for electric
utilities. Retail wheeling is clearly
an area of future contention. We
can reasonably expect to see efforts
in the next few years to mandate
retail wheeling. Retail wheeling
would have rremendous impact
upon the share of electric service
cost born by industrial customers,
who would have bargaining
power to seek bulk power from
other sources, and by residential
customers, who are unlikely to have
that same kind of bargaining power.
FERC also has a role to play
through its regulation of regional
transmission groups, such as
NEEPOOL, and the various
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regional electric reliability councils.
The NEEPOOL utilities are
negotiating a regional transmission
access agreement, pursuant to the
authority and encouragement in the
National Energy Policy Act. In a
very short time, such a transmission
access agreement may be in place.
Recently, there have been proposals
for several other kinds of regional
regulation, including the idea of
having regions such as New
England deal on a multi-state basis
with issues of common interests,
such as the environmental impact
of utilities or integrated resources
plans. So, in the future, the role
for regional regulation may expand
even further.
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Deregulation continues to be a key
topic for electric regulation. EPAct
reforms are clearly moving electric
utilities down a path similar to the
deregulation that occurred in the
natural gas industry. In natural gas,
deregulation eventually led
to the breakup of the vertically-
integrated industry into producers,
pipelines, and local distribution
companies. These more fragmented
companies are scrambling to secure
reliable supply and transmission
contracts in the gas industry. But,
on the whole, natural gas prices have
dropped over the years. Similarly, a
future can be envisioned in which
Maine utilities break into separate
generation companies) transmission
companies, and distribution compa-
nies. If such a transition does occur)
it will be painful for some, and
the role of the states will be
dramatically redirected.
As Edward Dinan and Ralph
Gelder discuss elsewhere in this
issue, rate base regulation has many
short-comings. Rate base regulation
distorts economic allocations
towards more capital intensive uses.
It discourages flexibility. Rate base
regulation provides no reward or
recognition for service as opposed
to capital investment, and it leads
to command-and-control regulation
that encourages utility managers to
be very risk averse and very conser-
vative in their decision making,
probably to the ultimate detriment
of the customers.
Incentive regulation
Incentive regulation is an alterna-
tive that ought to be examined.
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However, if we approach alterna-
tive regulation in a piecemeal
fashion, such as giving a specific
incentive for one specific program
goal, alternative regulation probably
will not substantially change the
overall direction of the utility.
Under a more comprehensive kind
of incentive regulation, such as has
been tried or proposed by San
Diego and by Public Service of
Indiana, the new incentives will
have much more dramatic impacts
upon utilities. There is also a kind
of regulation called "performance-
based regulation," which the state of
Mississippi has tried for the last few
years. Some flexibility in rates (as
we understand it, up to four per-
cent) is allowed on the basis of a
formula. The state of Mississippi
sets out seven goals that the state
would like to see achieved.
But in order to get to that point,
where we might consider such
worth while models, there first has
to be some kind of collaboration
among the utilities and the regula-
tors and the interested parties to
arrive at some shared goals. Until
we identify the goals which we have
in common and directions in which
we want to go, we are unlikely to
achieve very much. The example
of the recent transportation collabo-
ration in the aftermath of the
turnpike referendum may be a
model. People from the Maine
Department of Transportation and
from various interest groups were
able to find some common under-
standings as to goals. Similarly,
common goals that apply to electric
utilities can be found if thoughtful
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people work together towards some
common understanding. We have
identified some of those. Obvi-
ously, in a business as big and
complex as ours, it's very difficult
to enumerate them all.
Conclusion
One goal that is not conspicu-
ously present in today's implicit
goals is economic development. If
Maine is to end the stagnation and
its concurrent reduction in the
quality of life and the standard of
living) then a new initiative for
economic development is required.
But the pieces are not in place yet
for the state to really undertake that
course. Central Maine Power, and
probably all other utilities, would
be willing to work with the state
and with other interested parties to
move in that direction. Economic
development is a key element on
which we have not yet reached an
understanding.
In conclusion, traditional rate
base regulation is no longer suffi-
cient to meet today's needs. Utilities
need some kind of incentives to
move ahead, but only on a compre-
hensive, not piecemeal, basis .
Collaboration between regulators
and all the communities that are
interested and concerned with
electric utility issues is really the
best hope for Maine in the future.
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An argument for a
prudent approach to
alternative forms of
regulation
By Joseph G. Donahue
Introduction: The need to take a
step back
The current debate over alterna-
tive forms of regulation for Maine's
utilities presumes agreement on the
need for an alternative to the
current regulatory system, as well
as agreement on the fundamental
objectives of utility regulation.
This may not yet be the case.
Further, the debate over alternative
forms of regulation is often ex-
pressed in terms of a need to de-
velop forms of "incentive regula-
tlOn," as if the providing of incen-
tives to utilities is new. As we all
know, all forms of regulation (or
the lack of regulation) provide
incentives of different sorts, magni-
tudes and directions. Therefore
before going too far down the p~th
of incentive regulation, public
policy makers must first decide
whether and to what extent the
current regulatory scheme is
capable of accomplishing this State's
fundamental policy objectives,
creatin~ the incentives that promote
the achievement of those objectives,
and performing efficiently and
fairly . Obviously, the first question
must be: What should be this State's
utility policy and how is it different
than our current understanding of
the policy?
It often seems that much of the
debate over alternative or incentive
forms of regulation confuses the
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necessity for alternative forms of
regulation with an individual's
views on what ought to be the
fundamental policy objectives.
For example, it is argued that
incentive regulation is necessary
in order to promote economic
development. The function of
public utilities, regulators, and
utility customers in promoting
economic development is a funda-
mental policy question, not yet
fully decided. While the Public
Utilities Commission appears to
have taken modest steps in direc-
tions which may provide some
assistance for economic develop-
ment (for example, Bangor Hydro's
economic development rates and
CMP's incremental energy sales),
the fundamental policy debate has
not been fully developed.
Closely related to the issues and
arguments surrounding economic
development is the issue of pricing
flexibility. Utilities argue that they
need pricing flexibility in order to
meet the challenges of increasing
competition from alternative means
of serving ratepayers and users.
The current discussion over
alternative forms of pricing again
presumes the need for a funda-
mental change in the traditional
policy of utility price structuring,
i.e., the segregation of customers
into classes and the non-discrimina-
tory application of similar rates to
all customers within a class. The
argument over price flexibility pre-
supposes a need for complete
flexibility and, often, a desire for
no regulatory oversight . Again,
the Public Utilities Commission
has made modest steps in this
direction in response to specific
situations. However, the funda-
mental debate has not yet
concluded.
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Critical to any fundamental
debate over policy objectives are the
needs and views of the customers of
utilities. Interestingly absent from
much of the debate which has taken
place to date is this customer
perspective. Rather, the debate
appears to focus on the need for the
utility to compete, in order for the
utility to remain viable. Thus,
incentives are weighed in the
context of their ability to allow the
utility to be more competitive.
While there are very good argu-
ments that allowing the utility to be
competitive will benefit customers,
the interests of customers is often
the ending point, rather than the
beginning point, for the discussion.
I suggest that the debate over
alternative forms of regulation must
also start from the funda-mental
question of what do
customers need.
Finally, the participants in the
debate over alternative forms
of regulation almost universally
decry the current system as overly
litigious, time consulning, and
expensive. While improved effi-
ciency is important, it must also be
kept in mind that, in regulation, the
medium is often the message. For
example, regulatory lag, despite its
annoying features, provides a
substantial incentive for greater
utility efficiency. Similarly, the
litigation process is a rough embodi-
ment of the institutional role of the
Commission to act as a substitute
for the rough and tumble of the
competitive marketplace. Despite
its unpleasantries, the competitive
market model is emulated across the
world because of the =ill that it
produces. Similarly, the debate
over the need for alternative forms
of regulation should keep in mind
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whether the results produced are
consistent with public policy,
notwithstanding whether the
process is not particularly pretty.
Accordingly, I believe that both
Mr. Dinan and Mr. Flanagan are
correct in their views that the first
step in moving toward alternative
forms of regulation is to establish
the long term policy objectives.
Once the goals are established,
the adequacy of the current and
alternative regulatory systems to
achieve those goals can be assessed.
What is our objective and how do
we get there?
The reaffirmation of current
fundamental objectives or the
creation of new directions requires
the input of all interested and
affected parties. The debate cannot
be dominated solely by the regu-
lated entities and the regulators .
As I noted earlier, the needs and
concernS of utility customers and
the general public must be a major
focus of the discussion. Further,
the makers of general policy in our
executive and legislative branches
should be involved. In the end,
however, policy will be established
by the Legislature or the PUC, or
both, depending on the issue.
Although a "collaborative" process
may be used to get views and
perspectives into the process, in the
end the decision must be made by
those who have the responsibility
to make those decisions. The drive
towards efficiency and less burden-
some regulation should not lead to
unwarranted abdication of responsi-
bility of the policy makers, either
with regard to deciding on policy,
or with regard to carrying out the
policy through regulation.
Once the policy objectives are
clearly established, the debate can
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move immediately and meaning-
fully to whether current regulation
can promote the objectives,
whether some modifications of
current regulatory systems are
necessary, or whether an entirely
new form of regulation is required .
In weighing alternative regulatory
schemes, the fundamental criterion
will be =ill. Results will be
measured both in terms of whether
the regulation produces the desired
results (i.e., greatest achievement of
the policy objective) and whether it
produces undesired results (side
affects and counter- incentives).
We can be more tolerant of the
processes if the results are correct.
Obviously, in addition to results,
it is important that the process be
efficient and fair. These latter
attributes get to the fundamental
point with regard to any form of
regulation, i.e., the public must
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have confidence in the process and
in the regulators. If the public
believes that the process is fair and
that it is achieving the results they
want, then we should have consid-
erable confidence that regulation is
working.
In this regard, it may be worth
taking a moment to consider our
current regulatory objectives and
whether regulation is working. It
is interesting to note that there is a
great deal of similarity among the
objectives of the promoters of
regulatory reform who have
authored the other articles in this
series, and that these common
objectives have a great deal of
consistency with the objectives of
the current regulatory scheme.
We all agree on the basic maxim of
utility regulation that regulation
should act as a surrogate for or
simulate a competitive market-
driven economy, because we want
the results of low (competitive)
prices and quality service. The
basic idea is that regulation should
produce incentives for efficiency
and cost cutting, just as those are
produced by the competitive
marketplace. As discussed earlier,
there appears to be growing
consensus for a role for economic
development and for pricing flex-
ibility in the process. However, at
the same time, the fundamental
regulatory and legislative objectives
of least cost planning and demand
side management for electric
utilities and universal service for
telephone utilities have not been
fundamentally altered, although
recent legislation has arguably
modified the emphasis. Thus,
while we now move towards greater
pricing flexibility, a concern
remains with regard to protecting
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core customers and state energy
policy.
As discussed below, in the context
of CMP's experience, I submit that
the current regulatory process is not
doing all that badly and, given
encouragement, is capable of doing
better. Furthermore, it remains to
be proved that alternative forms of
regulation will be any more success-
ful or acceptable in achieving our
policy objectives.
The regulatory experiences of
Central Maine Power Company
The experiences of Central Maine
Power Company, its customers, and
its regulators during 1993 provide
an interesting and meaningful case
study in a number of the issues
surrounding the quest for alterna-
tive forms of regulation. The year
1993 began with the PUC ordering
the demise of the major incentive
ratemaking experiment known as
electric rate adjustment mechanism
(ERAM) . The year ended with the
Commission's decision in a tradi-
tional rate case, in which manage-
ment efficiency was the principle
issue. During the year, the Com-
mission moved forward with efforts
by CMP, its customers, and its own
staff in the area of greater pricing
flexibility.
As many of us are all too well
aware, the PUC's experiment with
ERAM for CMP has cast a pall over
incentive ratemaking. In 1991, the
Commission and numerous parties,
believing that command-and-
control regulation was not sufficient
to provide encouragement for
conservation) adopted a mechanism
to insulate CMP from changes in
volume of sales of electricity. In
order to achieve the llilili of
insulating CMP from the effects of
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lost sales due to conservation, the
Commission also produced the
ITrnl1 of insulating CMP from a
much greater threat during the early
1990s, i.e., the effects of the reces-
sion that shook Maine. Thus, while
creating an incentive favorable to
conservation, ERAM also removed
the incentive to preserve sales.
While CMP and its customers
wrangled over requests for reconsid-
eration of ERAM, fuel clause
proceedings, and rate design, CMP's
sales base eroded. While customers
faced declining profits, layoffs, and
economic insecurity, CMP's rev-
enues and earnings remained
healthy. In fact, certain industrial
customers argued that the PUC
should conduct a rate case for CMP,
in order to bring it back in touch
with reality. Finally, in January,
1993, the Commission decided to
terminate ERAM in December 1993
(three months ahead of schedule) .
The ERAM experience has one
silver lining: it has taught us all a
lesson. In the future, it will be
increasingly necessary that any
alternative or incentive ratemaking
innovation have clear objectives
and is analyzed and designed to
achieve those objectives without
undermining other objectives.
Consensus will be important. It
will also be important that real and
not amorphous limits be placed on
the amount of damage that can be
caused by the experiment.
The ending of ERAM ultimately
forced the filing of CMP's rate case.
Customers who had experienced
the ravages of the recession and the
need to economize, and who had
observed CMP's lack of similar
incentives (both as a result of cost-
plus regulation and ERAM), insisted
that CMP also feel the constraints
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of the competitive marketplace in
its revenues and thereby achieve
necessary cost savings and efficien-
cies. The Commission ultimately
decided that CMP's costs included
substantial inefficiencies and slashed
CMP's Tate increase request. (It is
more than ironic that the amount
the PUC deducted because of
management inefficiency was
remarkably close to CMP's first
year of accruals under ERAM!)
CMP's rate case also brought the
Commission and the parties directly
in touch with a real live competitive
issue: i.e., CMP's loss of its whole-
sale customer, Madison Electric
Works, and the associated retail
customer, Madison Paper indus-
tries. In an area in which there
were not regulatory constraints
on CMP's ability to bid and to
compete, CMP was not up to the
challenge, in the view of many.
Thus, the question arises whether
the problem is the existence of
regulation or the company's own
internal culture and incentives.
The answer to this question will
be found to a large extent in how
CMP responds to the Commission's
decision in the rate case. We have
already seen public announcements
that CMP is planning substantial
layoffs. If these layoffs produce
savings as well as a change in
corporate culture, then the
Commission's decision in the rate
case will have had the desired effect.
The Commission's rate case deci-
sion was made by the application
of standard regulatory ratemaking
principles. Thus, change at CMP
will be indicative of the success of
traditional ratemaking and its
ability to respond to current issues.
(The current debate among the
three Commissioners over the
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adjustment for attrition is also
indicative of the potential for
traditional regulation to change in
response to new issues, without the
need for an entirely new scheme.)
With regard to the flexibility of
current price regulation, the
Commission has reviewed and
approved a number of proposals for
flexible pricing for Central Maine
Power Company during the course
of 1993. Discount rates for indus-
trial customers in order to keep
them on the system or to increase
their purchases, thereby benefiting
all other customers, have been
reviewed and approved by the
Commission. The Commission has
also worked to streamline the
process for review. Also, CMP is
on the verge of filing a proposal for
flexible pricing in order to retain
its residential water heating load.
All of these developments are
taking place under the "traditional"
regulatory regime.
Finally, the Commission has
announced a strong interest in
pursuing the issue of alternative or
incentive ratemaking for CMP in
the form of a possible price cap.
The details will be explored in 1994.
However, many customers already
believe that 1993 has shown that
traditional regulation applied
strongly can work and possesses
enough flexibility to deal with new
Issues.
In the final analysis, it would
appear that the success or lack of
success in the regulation of utilities
has less to do with the formal
engines of regulation and more to
do with the quality, concern, and
energy of the persons who operate
those engines. While some desire
to achieve regulation in which the
results are not dependent upon the
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abilities and attentions of the
regulators, the fact remains that our
entire political and economic
system is strongly affected by the
quality of our political and business
leaders and managers. It is difficult
to imagine that it should be any
different for our regulatory institu-
tions that act as a surrogate for this
market economy.
Alternative forms of regulation
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